Tuesday

No “Fart” Tax, No “Fert” Tax, Yes “Soil Carbon Credits”

In 2006, when the Carbon Coalition started campaigning for farm-based carbon credits, the Australian Greenhouse Office believed that farmers would be forced to reduce emissions from animals and cropping or pay for offsets. They assumed that, because Agriculture was the second-biggest emitter of Greenhouse Gasses, farmers would have to pay. And they were certain there could be no credits for soil carbon captured and stored because there was no scientific proof of it.

By 2009 PM Kevin Rudd instructed his Minister For Agriculture to look into soil carbon.

By early 2010 Minister Tony Burke told farmers that there would be no ‘fart tax’ or methane bill and there would be no nitrogen fertilizer tax. He said that Agriculture was…“The only section of the Australian economy where we ignore the emissions, ignore them completely. Even if they go up, we ignore them… But if you’re able to reduce your emissions through abatement, you get cash.” And farmers who store carbon in soils and vegetation also get cash.

In August, 2010, PM Julia Gillard announced the Carbon Farming Initiative: “Farmers and landholders will benefit from a new income stream… Government [will] legislate clear rules for the recognition of carbon credits.

In October 2010, the Government released a document for consultation. It wants replies by 21 January, 2010. The program is scheduled to start on 1 July, 2011.

Why is the Government doing this?

The Government’s change of heart is not hard to understand when you look at the facts:

1. Agriculture as an industry was on its knees after 10 years of devastating drought when this turnaround. Climate Change “taxes” would cause the industry damage.

2. The changes to soil management that are required for carbon sequestration are the same required for building a buffer against Climate Change. The Government would have to spend a lot to convince farmers to make these changes anyway.

3. By choosing to set a price on carbon and allow a market form has the effect of getting polluters to pay for the changes needed.

4. The profit motive will reduce the need for expensive extension services running expensive programs to encourage change.

5. Food Security and Regional Conflict over Access to Resources is driving many international organizations to press the case for soil sequestration. Instead of reducing the capacity of the industry by imposing new taxes, the Australian Government has chosen to improve Agriculture’s profitability.

This document explains what is proposed and what changes we think should happen before the market begins.


What is the CFI?

The Commonwealth Government’s Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI), announced on 14 August, 2010, aims to give farmers, landholders and forest owners access to domestic and international carbon markets.

There are many opportunities for farmers and landholders in the CFI. They can earn offsets from a long list of activities, including:

· reforestation and revegetation – eg. plantations, integrated farm forestry and regrowth;

· reduced methane emissions from livestock – eg. diet management, rumen inoculants, etc.;

· reduced fertiliser emissions – eg. precision application, alternative fertilizers, etc.;

· manure management – eg. composting, anaerobic digesters and flaring;

· reduced emissions and/or increased sequestration in agricultural soils (soil carbon) – eg. no-till cultivation, grazing management, pasture cropping, nutrient management;

· savanna fire management –eg. avoiding large destructive fires while retaining environmentally-positive use of fire;

· avoided deforestation – eg. reduced land clearing;

· burning of stubble/crop residue - eg. stubble retention/incorporated, etc.;

· reduced emissions from rice cultivation – eg. reducing water levels in paddies to reduce methane emissions;

· reduced emissions from landfill waste – eg. composting, applying compost on soils.

Carbon Farmers of Australia recommend that Farmers decide which of the activities on this list are relevant to them and take a portfolio approach to them: Revenue from offsets will be maximized and opportunities won’t be missed. A typical ‘portfolio’ of activities could include fertilizer reduction/substitution + reduced methane from livestock + reduced landfill/farm composting + soil carbon sequestration.

While the scheme is scheduled to start on 1 July, 2011, not all the options will be ready. The forestry options were trading prior to the CFI and so will start early. Other ‘low hanging fruit’ includes reduced fertilizer usage and manure management/landfill waste. The others will come on stream as they have “Methodologies” approved.

Farmers and landholders have three options:

1. Running a project of their own, gaining the approvals and reporting on their progress.

2. Hiring a specialist to manage the reporting and administration.

3. Allow an offset aggregator to include their activity with others for trading.

Example: Farmer A chooses to undertake a project to reduce fertiliser use on the farm. Finds the relevant CFI methodology, applies to the CFI Scheme Administrator to become a recognised offsets provider and has their project approved. The farmer reduces fertiliser use (by precision application or biofertiliser substitution or other method). Each year the farmer completes a report, has it audited, then submits it to the Administrator. Credits are issued into the farmer’s account in the Offsets Registry. These are then able to be sold via a broker. The farmer can appoint an agent to handle all the adminstration. Or they can join other farmers as part of a ‘aggregation’ or pool.

No Get Rich Quick Scheme

The CFI is not a get-rich-quick scheme. Instead it is an incentive program that aims to help land managers make the shift to lower emissions practices.

When the CPRS was defeated, Australian consumers and corporates wanting to 'abate' their emissions were offered the voluntary market in the form of the National Carbon Offset Standard (NCOS). It covers all offsets not covered in Australia's Kyoto commitment - which is mainly farm carbon offsets. Forestry is covered by our Kyoto commitment and its promoters were looking forward to the CPRS. Instead they were hung out to dry. The CFI plugs that gap for forests because it applies to both Kyoto and non-Kyoto offsets. So the CFI and the NCOS fit together.

CFI… NCOS… CPRS… ETS…?

What is the difference between the CFI and NCOS and CPRS and ETS? It's simple: The CPRS (Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme) was a proposal by the Rudd Government for a "Compliance"-based "Cap & Trade" market for emissions offsets. That is an ETS or Emissions Trading Scheme. "Compliance" means 'compulsory'. "Cap & Trade" means emitters must change their business practices to reduce their emissions in order to reach a target level or 'cap'.. If they cannot reach that target in the timeframe given (called a Compliance Period, eg. 2008-2012) they must purchase 'offsets' or 'permits' from emitters who exceeded their targets and earned credits by doing so, or from companies earning credits by generating renewable energy or from companies earning credits by sequestering or capturing and holding CO2 in forests. Under the Rudd CPRS scheme only 1000 companies were required to meet a target in each compliance period. They were the 1000 top emitters. They could purchase offsets from local or international companies. The NCOS (National Carbon Offset Standard) was designed to operate alongside the CPRS 'compliance' market by providing a "Voluntary" scheme. It makes available to Australian companies and consumers a source of Australian offsets that they can purchase to offset their emissions so that they can make an advertising claim that their products etc. are carbon neutral or simply to make contribution to the climate change effort by offsetting a family's emissions. The NCOS covers only domestic offsets offered to voluntary buyers. The Carbon Farming Initiative completes the set. It covers domestic and international markets, both compliance and voluntary. The only market not covered is the market that is yet to start: the CPRS or the national domestic compliance market.

Who are the buyers?

Demand for CFI credits is expected to come from foreign governments seeking to meet their Kyoto obligations, as well as companies overseas seeking to meet their obligations under national or regional schemes, such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme. CFI credits could also be attractive to companies operating in markets dominated by the voluntary market, such as Australia's traditional trade partner Japan. One important category of buyers not mentioned in the Consultation Paper are consumers overseas who are fans of the country and have a soft spot for Aussie farmers. Back at home, some companies need offsets to meet obligations where State Governments have introduced their own compliance schemes.

Methodologies: Make Your Own

A “Methodology” is a step-by-step plan for helping farmers earn offsets. There is no limit to the number of Methodologies, because the Carbon Market is a free enterprise system. Individuals are free to trade with each other, so long as they don’t break the law. The Government is developing methodologies, with the help of industry. Private project developers can also design their own.

A Methodology has the following parts:

1. A description of the activities that will either avoid emissions or capture greenhouse gasses. The carbon sinks and carbon sources touched Eg. soil, livestock.

2. How the baseline (starting point) and amounts of Greenhouse Gases removed or avoided.

3. How buyers can be reassured that the activities in one location don’t create more emissions somewhere else.

4. How the performance of the program will be measured.

5. How the project will be monitored.

The decision to approve a Methodology is taken by the Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency on the advice of the members of the Domestic Offset Integrity Committee - an independent expert panel appointed by the Government.

Integrity Standards Under Review

The Carbon Farming Initiative Consultation is just that: a Consultation. Your input is requested. The paper includes “Integrity Standards”. They are a list of ‘rules’ that are proposed to give buyers confidence that the abatement offsets they are buying aren’t just smoke and mirrors – that they are real. These rules include:

Additional - the emissions saved or extracted would not have happened without the offset, but are genuinely additional to other efforts.

Permanence – the emissions saved or extracted are not released for the period of the active life of the particular Greenhouse Gasses, eg. CO2 – 100 years

Leakage – the project does not create increases in emissions somewhere else that cancels out the inititial saving.

Measurable and verifiable – all activity must be accurately measured or estimated; each offset credit must stand for one tonne of CO2-e; auditing must be independent.

Conservative – assumptions, figures, and measurement must be conservative to avoid over-claiming.

Internationally consistent – methodologies and reporting practices aligned with those adopted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Supported by peer-review science – scientific evidence submitted must be ‘peer-reviewed’ which means it has been approved by other scientists in the same field as those doing the research and that it has been accepted for publication in a scientific journal.

Integrity Standards Vs The Urgency

The Integrity Standards focus on making the transaction possible by making sure the consumer is confident that they are getting what they paid for. No confidence, no market, no abatement, no sequestration of CO2. The logic is undeniable. But it is only as simple as that when you focus only on the transaction.

Turn the telescope around and you see a world that needs as many farmers as possible sequestering as much carbon as possible in their soils and vegetation as quickly as possible. The reason? Because there is little chance that global warming can be held to a increase of less than 2°C without it. Some of the world’s leading scientists are saying that the rate at which clean energy infrastructure can be built compared to the rate at which global demand for energy will grow make it now impossible to meet the 2°C target without a big soil carbon component.

Scientists, including the world’s most famous Climate Change scientist, NASA’s James Hansen, agree that renewables will not be ready to supply the world’s energy demands for up to 50 years, if then. In Smart Solutions to Climate Change, Chris Green of McGill University and Isabel Galiana look at current rates of progress and conclude that by 2050 alternative energy sources will produce less than half the power needed to stabilise carbon emissions. By 2100, the gap would be even wider.

Some prominent Australian scientists point to soil carbon as the solution: “It will be next to impossible for Australia to achieve the scale of [emissions] reductions required in sufficient time to avoid dangerous climate change unless we also remove carbon from the atmosphere and store it in vegetation and soils,” the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists told the recent Victorian Inquiry into Soil Carbon. Even the CSIRO agrees Dr Michael Battaglia, Theme Leader, Sustainable Agriculture Flagship, CSIRO told the inquiry: “What [soil carbon sequestration] actually gives us is time to make those adjustments [transition from burning coal].”

Emissions reductions won’t slow down the process of climate change because it is not tomorrow’s emissions that are causing the problem, they are your Grandfather’s emissions - the carbon released into the atmosphere 70 years ago - that are causing Global Warming. Luckily, we have the only process for extracting billions of tonnes of CO2 every year for 50 years, fully deployed and scaled up, ready to start: Photosynthesis, in the form of 5.5bn hectares of farmland around the globe. Scientists such as soil carbon authority Professor Rattan Lal estimate the process can remove 3billion tonnes of CO2 annually for 50 years. He testified before the US Senate that soil carbon can be a “bridge to the future” that “buys us time”.

James Hansen and Rattan Lal agree that the world’s farmers can draw down the CO2 equivalent of 50ppm and hold it for 50 years. With the globe racing towards 400ppm, hoping to stop it at 450ppm (to hold the increase to 2°C), soil sequestration is attractive and available and relatively cheap. It would forestall the need for deeper, faster cuts in the future and it would protect the economy from damage. So why is it not activated immediately? Because we are looking down the wrong end of the telescope.

Adapting the Integrity Standards - Innovating Kyoto

The starting point for any methodology for carbon offsets is the Kyoto Protocols. These principles were developed primarily to govern the measurement and management of industrial sources and forestry sinks. In both cases the direction for the Carbon is one-way. Agricuture, on the other hand, is dominated by biological cycles which are embodied in the Carbon Cycle. Agricultural Biomass and Soil and the Animals that live on them are part of that Cycle – ie. are both sources and sinks. The Protocols, designed as they are on a linear plane, do not accommodate the dynamic nature of the food and fibre production processes. For the world to enjoy the benefits of “Climate Smart Agriculture’s” triple wins of mitigation, adaptation and food security, as identified by the World Bank, the Protocols must be adapted to achieve their objectives within a more complex environment. The Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency uses the current Kyoto definition of Standards such as Additionality as a starting point for innovation. The Consultation Paper makes this request: “Stakeholders are invited to comment on this approach to assessing additionality and whether alternative approaches should be considered.” Carbon Farmers of Australia has set out its response to the Integrity Standards under the following headings: Standard – current definition, Questions arising from current definition, Principles on which Standard should be redefined, Suggested Action Points.

The Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency uses the current Kyoto definition of Standards such as Additionality as a starting point for innovation. The Consultation Paper makes this request: “Stakeholders are invited to comment on this approach to assessing additionality and whether alternative approaches should be considered.”

Carbon Farmers of Australia has set out its response to the Integrity Standards under the following headings:

Standard – current definition

Questions arising from current definition

Recommendations

Principles on which Standard should be redefined

Suggested Action Points

This is an important opportunity which should not be missed. Please feel free to comment on, add to, strike out, disagree with… what we have proposed.

Standard 1: Additional

Standard 1: Additional – Current definition - If the change in land management has already been made or would have been made for business reasons* or becomes common practice in the district, it cannot earn credits because the abatement does not reduce emissions or sequester greenhouse gases any more than if the scheme was not in operation. (*Business reasons can include higher productivity or profitability.) The Consultation Paper mentions a “Positive list” of activities that would be automatically additional: not-for-harvest carbon sink forests, on-farm tree planting, or capture and flaring methane from manure. An important indicator of Additionality is that the activity depends upon the revenue from the sale of offsets to make it possible; ie. the activity is not a source of profit.

Questions Arising From Current Definition of Additional:

1. Would the outcome be unjust were farmers who adopted climate friendly land management practices before offsets emerged to be disqualified for starting early? Would it also be untenable if those who continued emitting up until the scheme commenced qualified?

2. Would the excluded farmer have only goodwill to stop them reversing the land management practices that sequester carbon if there is no contract or incentive payment to lock in the land controlled by thousands of early adopter farmers?

3. Must the Scheme Administrator be able to read minds to tell if a land manager was considering a particular change as part of their normal business development?

4. How will the Scheme Administrator decide which farmer will be rewarded and which will not when the point is reached at which a practice becomes ‘common practice’ in a location?

5. Will the many farmers who have been involved in Catchment soil carbon programs warned that their involvement disqualified them from offsets revenue?

6. If an increase in soil carbon has co-benefits that include reduced erosion, improved water efficiency, improved soil structure, etc. which may increase productivity, does soil carbon sequestration therefore fall outside the Additionality Standard?

Recommendations

As both Minister Combet and Minister Burke have said that the ‘win-win-win’ nature of the opportunity is its great attraction, we suggest that Additionality be redefined on the following principles:

Principle 1. The Standard should not discriminate against Carbon Farmers who are early movers, innovators and leaders in environmentally-positive farming techniques. These farmers provided the Government and the industry with the means of sequestering carbon in soils. The Scheme could possibly attract ridicule and bad press. And brand damage.

Principle 2. The Standard cannot assume that the Farmer is Economic Man and that the potential for higher productivity or profits would be sufficient to change land management practices. Farm practices are cultural and often defy logic in their application.

Principle 3. The Standard should be appropriate to the conditions of the industry it seeks to regulate. The Kyoto Protocols were originally drawn up to address industrial emissions and encourage renewable energy. In this environment, issues are clear-cut. The Standard’s ‘common practice’ criterion as proposed would disqualify zero-tillage and grazing management because they have reached adoption rates of 53% and 57% nationally, yet they are foundation practices on which other practices are launched. What will attract the other 40+%? Land degradation continues to spread, such as dryland salinity and erosion.

Principle 4. The Standard should address the real causes of GHG emissions from farmland. Farm landscape degradation and emissions from soils are caused by market failure. Markets refuse to pay the farmer the full value of their produce, (including the environmental cost of production)] forcing them to overgraze and over-crop the soils. Offsets are therefore a means of redressing the balance.

Suggestions for Action on the Additional Standard

Carbon Farmers of Australia suggests the following course of action, based on the possible outcomes outlined above:

Action 1: Eliminate the requirement that the practice – to be considered ‘additional’ - should not increase productivity or profitability. Rationale: Farmers require significant incentive to overcome conservatism and inertia to make a change in practices.

Action 2. Eliminate all other aspects of Additionality except the pre-existing practice provision.

Action 3. Allow those who have already adopted sequestering practices to claim Additionality if they adopt a portfolio approach, introducing a new combination of practices that increase soil carbon.

Action 4. Introduce a ‘Stewardship’ payment for those early adopters unwilling or unable to change their practices.

Action 5. Consider the definition of Additionality proposed by the Iowa and Illinois Corn Growers Associations. The Corn Growers have reconceptualised additionality: “GHG project activities shall result in carbon benefits additional to those that would have taken place in the absence of the activity and that are not already required by law or regulation.” Additionality for agriculture “results from a cropping cycle that is either planted directly or is naturally occurring as in rangeland. If there is more carbon in the soil at the end of a crop cycle than there was in the beginning of the cycle, then ‘additionality’ has occurred.”

Standard 2 – Permanent

Standard 2 – Permanent – Current definition: “For practical, biological carbon stores would be generally considered permanent if they were maintained (on a net basis) for at least 100 years.” “The ‘Risk of Reversal’ is unique to sequestration activities and needs to be addressed.”

“The Government recognises the difficulties involved in making very long-lasting decisions about land use and the value of preserving future land use flexibility.” The Government’s approach to permanence: 1. Farmers can withdraw if they ‘relinquish’ credits received. 2. A risk of reversal buffer of 5% insures the Scheme from re-release. 3. Credits must also be relinquished if carbon stores are destroyed and not re-established. The 5% buffer protects the farmer from losses in bushfire or drought.

Questions arising from the Current Definition of Permanence:

1. Is this approach likely to attract any interest among Growers? What percentage of Growers would sign a soil carbon sequestration contract for

2. Given the perceived risks for farmers in such a Scheme, what price would carbon need to be to tip the ‘Risk/Return’ scales?

3. How short would a contract have to be to attract large numbers of Growers to contribute to ‘stalling’ Global Warming? 50 years? 25 years? 5 years?

4. Is the Prime Carbon approach of building a 100% buffer as a risk management protection, ensuring no Grower would have to relinquish credits meet the Government’s criteria for “a uniform approach… simple to administer and justified because there is limited data to enable project level activity risks to be accurately and easily quantified”?

5. Is the rationale for a short (5 years) period: “Behaviour Change becomes Practice Change becomes Culture Change” feasible?

7. Could there be potential for extending the ‘risk buffer’ concept to cover large numbers of growers trading not as individuals but in aggregates. The Iowa and Illinois Corn Growers Associations have redefined Permanence using the concept of “collective persistence” to ensure duration over time. Soil carbon reserve pools serve as a risk buffer to provide insurance of adequate credits should a Project Owner fail to produce agreed upon quantities. Permanence is “a function of the farm aggregate collectively using credit practices of avoided emissions and carbon sequestration rather than the function of an individual producer.” While individuals might temorarily change their sequestration rate for whatever reason, not all farmers involved are likely to do the same. “As an aggregate there is a collective persistence of carbon credits,.” The Corn Growers claim that when the effects of large groups of producers are measured collectively, credit practices increase each year. Their Draft Agricultural Soil Credit Standard is reported to be in the second phase of evaluation by the USDA.

8. Given the importance placed on peer-reviewed data, is the claim that soil carbon can be significantly reduced by bushfire and drought based on peer-reviewed science or is it the type of fact – like “Australia’s soils are too ancient and degraded to sequester significant amounts of carbon” – that everyone knows but no one knows where it came from – a cultural artefact known as a ‘furphy’? Has the Department questioned the assumptions on which much of the scientific opinion is based?

9. Why 100years? What product or commodity can we name that we sell today and must warrant for 100 years? What transactional settlement period is T+100 years? Why are we asking landowners to go longer than government is willing to regulate the environment and business? The only real reason is that people are looking at matching up atmospheric accounting to the IPCC 100 year GWP. Those same studies have also looked at atmospheric impact over 20 years. Since most of the GHG gases have a more severe impact over the first 20 than the next 80, why not look to the immediate climatic impact.

10. If Soil Carbon is to be ‘a secure bridge to the future’ by drawing down the equivalent of 50ppm for 50 years, can this period be justified as the Permanence Standard by virtue of its critical role?

11. Has Soil Carbon’s reputation for instability – which is based on a misunderstanding of carbon dynamics – turned Permanence into a high risk factor which will require discounted pricing? There are two theories of sequestration: The Fixed Molecule Theory Vs The Cycling Molecule Theory. The Fixed Molecule Theory is popular.Carbon is sequestered in soil when rendered immobile in the form of stable fractions such as humus. Carbon held temporarily in labile fractions cannot be said to be sequestered because it is oxidised in a short time. Therefore only

carbon stored in soil as humus or char can be counted towards a farmer’s tradable tonneages of stored carbon.” But such a restraint would reduce the incentive for landholders to convert to Carbon Farming and lose the benefits to society of the sequestration. On the other hand, The Cycling Molecule Theory starts from the fact that Carbon by its nature cycles. The Carbon Cycle is fundamental to life on Earth. All forms of Carbon are cycling between sink and source. These cycles vary in length of time, some very short, some very long, depending on the nature of the sink. No sink is permanent. All sinks act like ‘holding bays’ - some hold Carbon Molecules for centuries and some for seconds. Climate Change is caused by imbalance in the cycles: ie. too much carbon is being held in the Atmosphere and the Ocean and not enough in other forms. Carbon sequestration occurs when the Carbon Cycle is adjusted to delay its transition from one form to another. When Carbon is captured by Vegetation and becomes a component of soil it enters a ‘holding bay’. Sequestration takes place when the amount Carbon in the holding bay increases and that increase is maintained. The volume of Carbon in the holding bay is not affected by the rate of C atoms escaping so long as the rate of C atoms arriving remains equivalent or greater. If the rate of arrivals is equal to the rate of departures, Carbon is said to be in a “steady state”. If the rate of arrivals exceeds that of departures, Carbon is said to be sequestered. If the rate of arrivals falls short of the rate of departures, Carbon is said to be emitted. Therefore the key to sequestration in soil is not the individual molecule but the representative value of a molecule. Increases in “Molecular Value” can be created by changing land management practices that encourage carbon to increase act naturally.

Recommendations

Carbon Farmers of Australia recommends the Permanence requirement be decided on the following Principles:

Principle 1. That the Permanence performance of the offset be defined according to the role it plays in the global effort to restrain Global Warming and prevent it from going beyond 2°C.

Principle 2. That the concept of Permanence applied to biosequestration be of such a kind that enables the sinks to perform to their capacity.

Principle 3. That the approach to risk be not ‘what risk if we do’, but ‘what do we risk if we don’t’.

Suggestions for Action on the Permanence Standard

Action 1: Define Biosequestration units by a brand name that explains their function, ie., ‘a bridge to the future.’

Action 2: The imperative to have as many farmers capturing as much carbon as possible as fast as possible as a sort-term emergency stop gap requires that Permanence be made more flexible because it is a barrier to recruitment.

Standard 3: Avoiding Leakage

Standard 3: Avoiding leakage – Current definition: The Project must not ca emissions to be shifted elsewhere, negating the offsets. For instance, heavy application of nitrogen fertilizer is one way to grow carbon under pasture. But it also releases an even more dangerous Greenhouse Gas Nitrous Oxide (N2O) which is 300 times more potent than CO2.

Questions arising from current definition of Avoiding Leakage

1. Is it possible to police this Standard without adding costs for auditing and without spying on landholders

Standard 4: Measurable and verifiable

Standard 4: Measurable and verifiable – Current definition: Each offset credit represents one tonne of CO2-e removed or emissions reduction. It must be measured or estimated accurately. Monitoring and auditing must be consistent and independently verified. For biosequestration activities that record great variations of carbon, the Government suggests long-term changes be measured and seasonal or other variability accounted for by means of a rolling average.

Questions Arising About The Current Definition of Measurement and Verification

1. Is the purpose of the system of measurement to reassure the buyer or to reward the grower? If the cost of accurate measurement makes the exercise unfeasible, there are other means of reassuring buyers to accept a higher level of uncertainty.

2. Is 95% Certainty necessary when the buyer is buying an intangible product for community purposes (as part of a collective action) from a community pool in order to change the behaviour of individuals in key roles?

3. Have the Means in this case overshadowed the End? The conclusion that soil carbon has attributes which make it unsuitable for inclusion in an accounting scheme would indicate that the accounting scheme was the problem, given the potential benefits of soil carbon. The accounting scheme was established to facilitate a market only because the global community wanted to encourage widespread adoption of desirable practices. The IPCC must understand that its purpose is not to produce a perfect accounting model. It’s purpose is to deploy the resources of its member nations to urgently remove CO2e from the atmosphere.

Recommendations

Carbon Farmers of Australia recommend that the issue of Measurement and Verification be considered in the light of the following Principles:

Principle 1. The Purpose of Measurement, Monitoring and Verification is not to Measure, Monitor and Verify. It is to enable a transaction to take place.

Principle 2. Measurement is a matter of risk management. It can be offset by the price mechanism and statistical averaging.

Principle 3. The Value of the Service performed should be reflected in the price paid. The cost of Measurement and Verification should then be calculated relative to the returns.

Suggestions for Action on the issue of Measurement and Verification

Action 1: Reducing the cost of Measurement and Verification - There are several options for removing the barrier of cost of measurement:

•Aggregated Sampling & Analysis: The current price of sampling is high on a per unit basis. But in the real world each landholder is not likely to be negotiating with a laboratory for sampling services. They will form buyer groups. Aggregators will negotiate on behalf of large numbers of landholders. The Government could play a role in tendering the entire Australian sampling opportunity to get the lowest per unit cost. What price for core sampling 130,000 properties in Australia?

• Predictive Ratios: Exploit the statistical properties of soil carbon flux to build predictive ratios. Baseline with 100cm cores, calculate the ratio of soil carbon in top 30cm over the total sample, and all monitoring samples thereafter need only be 30cm to measure total 100cm. Similarly, reduce the number of samples required by building predictive ratios between initial 200 samples and 20 samples per unit. Further, the statistical relationship between the individual samples and a single ‘bulked up” sample may enable the sampling to be dramatically reduced. The questions arise: what degree of uncertainty is acceptable to the Kyoto accountants? What tolerances will they allow soil carbon given the extraordinary uncertainty factors they allow other sources and sinks? What degree of accuracy (individual unit vs aggregated) would satisfy a buyer?

• Simplified System: By stripping unnecessary elements from the testing regime and retaining only those needed to achieve our purpose (carbon sequestered), we can further reduce costs. Do we need to map soil types? Do we need to measure anything other than total carbon? How often do we need to measure bulk density?

• Hybrid MMV system: The number of core samples could be reduced if a combination of visual audit and/or remote sensing were incorporated. An annual visual aduit could cover the following “Indicators” or proxies: • increased groundcover and therefore biomass • increased perenniality & therefore produce more biomass • increased biodiversity of plants species and wildlife in and on the soil • reduced soil disturbance and compaction.

• Revenue Context: Any cost for sampling should be considered against the price of carbon. This has ranged from $1 to $40 and some estimate it will reach $100 when the big 3 emitters (USA, China, India) finally enter the market.

Action 2: Engage buyers, traders and regulators in discussion of MMV issues and enlist their help to develop a workable system. References will be made to analogous uncertainties in other categories of abatement and GHG offset. The engagement strategy includes interviews and workshops with carbon traders, commodity market experts, statisticians, buyers, regulators, and growers. Scientists will be involved where they understand that the objective of the exercise is not precision but practical solutions.We are acting on Professor Rattan Lal’s suggestion that integrated teams will solve the problem of a market mechanism, rather than teams of scientists. For this reason we would approach a small group of diverse, talented people who can serve on a working team.

• market economists

• actuaries

• engineers

• commodity traders

• innovators

• philosophers

(Re the philosophers, Albert Einstein once said that understanding taxation was beyond a mathematician and would require the skills of a philosopher.)

Action 3: Act now. There is no time for new 3 year research projects. The time has come for learning by doing. Take action and monitor results. Assume we are wrong and look for evidence of it. The risk of not doing something is now greater than the risk of doing the wrong thing.

Standard 5: Conservative

Standard 5: Conservative – Current definition: All assumptions and calculations and estimations should be conservative so there is no over-estimation of abatement levels.

Questions arising from the current definition of Conservative:

1.Does the skew towards the interest of the managing risk for the buyer reflect the current demand situation, where there is no compulsion to buy in most of the biggest markets around the world?

2. While we acknowledge the importance of demand, how will the Scheme operate without supply?

Recommendations

Carbon Farmers of Australia recommend that the issue of Conservative be considered in the light of the following Principles:

Principal 1. Conservative behaviour is inappropriate in an emergency.

Principle 2. It is the ultimate welfare of the buyer that should be the guiding principle.

Suggestions for Action on the issue of Conservative

Action 1. Promote a sense of urgency among buyers and other stakeholders.

Standard 6: Internationally consistent

Standard 6: Internationally consistent – Current definition: Methodologies must ‘be consistent with (not necessarily the same as)’ the system that Australia users to report to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This system is called the National Greenhouse Accounts.

Questions arising from the current definition of Internationally Consistent:

1. Has the bias in the National Greenhouse Accounting methodology against soil carbon sequestration been rectified or will Australian farmers be disadvantaged by the fact that the soil carbon models were populated with data that exclusively reflected emissions only.[1]

2. How widespread is the knowledge of this situation among scientists? (A member of the DOIC described the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory as ‘world’s best practice’.)

Recommendations

Carbon Farmers of Australia recommend that the issue of Internationally consistent be considered in the light of the following Principles:

Principle 1. Australia can lead in generating a more appropriate international platform farm-based offsets.



[1] “The main purpose of this program is to improve the accuracy of carbon dioxide emission values from soil carbon following land use and land use change (LULUC) in the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (NGGI) for the 1990 baseline year.” Skjemstad, J. and Spouncer, L., Integrated Soils Modelling for the National Carbon Accounting System (National Carbon Accounting System technical report; no. 36) 2003